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Stare Decisis and Constitutional
Supremacy: Will Our Charter Past
Become an Obstacle to Our
Charter Future?
Joseph J. Arvay, Q.C., Sheila M. Tucker and
Alison M. Latimer*
I. INTRODUCTION
Thirty years ago, the enactment of the Constitution Act, 1982, Part I
of which was the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms,1 was a
transformative moment in Canada’s development as a constitutional
democracy. It guaranteed a set of civil rights and freedoms (which had
hitherto not been constitutionally entrenched and which many viewed as
ill-protected under the Canadian Bill of Rights2) and, by the addition of
section 52 to the Constitution Act, gave expression to the principle of
constitutional supremacy in providing that “any law that is inconsistent
with the Constitution is, to the extent of the inconsistency, of no force
and effect”.3
In the early days of Charter jurisprudence, the Supreme Court of
Canada made clear that the Charter represented a departure from the
timorous approach to rights protection that prevailed under the Canadian
Bill of Rights. So, for example, in R. v. Big M Drug Mart Ltd., in the
context of freedom of religion, the Supreme Court of Canada held that
unlike the Canadian Bill of Rights, the Charter “does not simply ‘recog*
Joseph J. Arvay, Q.C., is the managing partner of Arvay Finlay, Barristers, Vancouver,
B.C. Sheila M. Tucker is associate counsel with Davis LLP, Vancouver, B.C. Alison M. Latimer is
an associate with Arvay Finlay.
1
Part I of the Constitution Act, 1982, being Schedule B to the Canada Act 1982 (U.K.),
1982, c. 11 [hereinafter “Charter”].
2
Canadian Bill of Rights, S.C. 1960, c. 44, reprinted in R.S.C. 1985, App. III. See, e.g.,
Peter W. Hogg, Constitutional Law of Canada, 5th ed. (Toronto: Carswell, 1998), at c. 35.5 and
36.1.
3
R. v. Conway, [2010] S.C.J. No. 22, [2010] 1 S.C.R. 765, at para. 65 (S.C.C.) [hereinafter
“Conway”].

62

SUPREME COURT LAW REVIEW

(2012), 58 S.C.L.R. (2d)

nize and declare’ existing rights as they were circumscribed by legislation current at the time of the Charter’s entrenchment. The language of
the Charter is imperative.”4 However, 30 years on, many legal observers
have questioned the courts’ success in giving full force to the imperatives
of the Charter. Joel Bakan describes the conundrum as follows:
The Charter’s potentially radical and liberatory principles of equality,
freedom, and democracy are administered by a fundamentally
conservative institution — the legal system — and operate in social
conditions that routinely undermine their realization.5

That said, there really cannot be any doubt that the Supreme Court of
Canada (and indeed, the many lower courts throughout the country) has
made any number of decisions under the Charter that have had very
significant emancipatory impacts in Canada. The Court has matured into
an authoritative institution of constitutional review; but once old enough
to have a past, a body is defined, in part, by its relationship to that past.
We have been asked to provide a paper dealing with the broad topic
of transformative Charter moments. Transformative means “a thorough
or dramatic change”.6 This paper considers stare decisis — an inherently
conservative doctrine that champions the goals of consistency, certainty
and predictability in the law. Admittedly, stare decisis appears to operate
in direct contradiction to the spirit of our assigned topic. Indeed, an
examination of the role of stare decisis in Charter litigation reveals some
transformative Charter moments lost. The core concern of this paper is to
point out that very fact, and to consider some means for minimizing that
effect.
Although we examine both the “horizontal” and the “vertical” conventions of stare decisis, we focus on the latter and thus the extent to
which lower courts may depart from prior decisions of the Supreme
Court of Canada addressing similar legal issues in the wake of a sea
change in legislative and social facts.7 Our purpose is to offer an approach to this doctrine that allows for the goals of stare decisis to be met
while giving effect to the constitutionally entrenched principle of
constitutional supremacy which, of necessity, must leave room for the
4

[1985] S.C.J. No. 17, [1985] 1 S.C.R. 295, at para. 115 (S.C.C.) [hereinafter “Big M”].
Joel Bakan, Just Words: Constitutional Rights and Social Wrongs (Toronto: University of
Toronto Press, 1997), at 3.
6
Oxford Concise English Dictionary, 9th ed., 1996, at 1481.
7
That stare decisis applies at all in Charter litigation is assumed for the purpose of this
paper. However, we note that the more radical proposition that stare decisis has no application at all
in light of the imperative of constitutional supremacy is worthy of some debate.
5
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Charter’s liberatory principles to be interpreted and applied in the face of
changing social and other conditions. We will argue that this approach
enhances sound judicial administration and the legitimacy and acceptability of the common law — other principles at the core of stare
decisis.8 It also ensures that there will continue to be transformative
Charter moments as evolving contexts require.
The force of stare decisis in these circumstances was an issue of central importance in the recent Ontario Court of Appeal decision in Bedford.9 We hope to persuade the reader that the Court of Appeal wrongly
concluded that stare decisis applies to prevent lower courts from making
a new decision under the Charter when faced with a fundamental change
in the social and legislative facts underpinning the prior Supreme Court
of Canada decision. As a result of this error, the Ontario Court of Appeal
lost an important opportunity to participate in a transformative moment
in Charter history. This issue is of great practical and immediate importance. It has already become an issue in determining whether the trial
judge presently seized of a case challenging the absolute prohibition
against physician-assisted dying (Carter v. Canada (Attorney General)10
can differ from the decision of the Supreme Court of Canada in Rodriguez v. British Columbia (Attorney General).11 From a broader perspective, it is also an issue of enormous pragmatic significance for litigants
8
Bedford v. Canada (Attorney General), [2012] O.J. No. 1296, 2012 ONCA 186, at para.
56 (Ont. C.A.) [hereinafter “Bedford”], citing David Polowin Real Estate Ltd. v. Dominion of
Canada General Insurance Co., [2005] O.J. No. 2436, 76 O.R. (3d) 161, at paras. 119-120 (Ont.
C.A.).
9
At issue in Bedford, id., was the constitutional validity of ss. 210, 212(1)(j) and 213(1)(c)
of the Criminal Code, R.S.C. 1985, c. C-46. The Attorneys General of Canada and Ontario took the
position that the Supreme Court of Canada’s decision in Reference re ss. 193 and 195.1(1)(c) of the
Criminal Code (Man.), [1990] S.C.J. No. 52, [1990] 1 S.C.R. 1123 (S.C.C.) [hereinafter “Prostitution Reference”], coupled with the principle of stare decisis, prevented the application judge from
considering or reconsidering the constitutional validity of ss. 210 and 213(1)(c). The Ontario Court
of Appeal concluded in Bedford, at para. 52, that “the application judge did not err in considering
whether or not the bawdy house [s. 210] and communicating provisions [s. 213(1)(c)] violate s. 7 of
the Charter“ because both the legal issues raised and the legal framework to be applied were
different than they were at the time of the Prostitution Reference. However, the Ontario Court of
Appeal found that “the application judge erred in reconsidering whether or not the communicating
provision [s. 213(1)(c)] is an unjustified infringement of s. 2(b) of the Charter. The Supreme Court
definitively decided this issue in the Prostitution Reference, and only that court may revisit it.”
10
[2012] B.C.J. No. 886, 2012 BCSC 886 (B.C.S.C.) [hereinafter “Carter”]. The authors of
this paper, along with Grace Pastine, act as counsel for the plaintiffs in Carter.
11
[1993] S.C.J. No. 94, [1993] 3 S.C.R. 519 (S.C.C.) [hereinafter “Rodriguez”]. There are
many reasons why Rodriguez is not an impediment to the trial judge seized of Carter reaching a
different conclusion on the constitutional questions asked. These reasons include that different legal
arguments have been advanced and that there have been changes in the law since the judgment in
Rodriguez was rendered. However, a full discussion of these issues is beyond the scope of this paper.
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deciding whether to undertake a Charter case at all in the face of an
ostensibly binding Supreme Court of Canada decision.

II. THE ROLE OF STARE DECISIS
The Honorable Edward D. Re, Chief Judge, United States Customs
Court, explained stare decisis as follows:
The doctrine, from stare decisis et non quieta movere, “stand by the
decision and do not disturb what is settled,” is rooted in the common
law policy that a principle of law deduced from a judicial decision will
be considered and applied in the determination of a future similar case.
In essence, this policy refers to the likelihood that a similar or like case
arising in the future will be decided in the same way.12

The doctrine has a horizontal axis and a vertical axis, both of which will
be described briefly below. In “Precedent Unbound?”, Debra Parkes
explains:
As things have developed in Canada, the concept of “binding
precedent” is limited to the vertical convention. Courts lower in the
applicable hierarchy are bound to follow decisions of a higher court.
The concept of stare decisis is used more broadly to apply to decisions
of higher courts (the vertical convention) and to previous decisions of
the same court, albeit often differently constituted (the horizontal
convention). In the latter case decisions are not strictly binding, but
should be followed unless there are compelling reasons to overrule
them.13

Next we discuss how Canadian courts have treated these conventions.
1. Horizontal Convention of Stare Decisis
The horizontal convention of stare decisis refers to the extent to which
a court will overrule one of its own earlier judgments.14 This issue has
arisen a number of times at the Supreme Court of Canada, most recently

12
Honorable Edward D. Re, Chief Judge, United States Customs Court, “Stare Decisis”
(paper presented at a seminar for Federal Appellate Judges sponsored by the Federal Judicial Center,
May 13-16, 1975), at 1-2.
13
Debra Parkes, “Precedent Unbound? Contemporary Approaches to Precedent in Canada”
(2006-2008) 32 Man. L.J. 135, at 137 [hereinafter “Precedent Unbound?”].
14
“Precedent Unbound?”, id., at 146.
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in Health Services and Support – Facilities Subsector Bargaining Assn.
v. British Columbia15 and Ontario (Attorney General) v. Fraser.16
Health Services was itself a significant transformative “moment” in
Supreme Court of Canada history, in that the Court reversed a trilogy of
decisions holding that section 2(d) of the Charter (freedom of association) did not extend to collective bargaining.17 In Health Services, the
Court overruled the 20-year-old labour trilogy, concluding that the
reasons given therein for not extending the protection simply could not
withstand “principled scrutiny”18 and that a failure to protect collective
bargaining was inconsistent with both Canada’s “historic recognition of
the importance of collective bargaining to freedom of association” and
international law.19 In light of these considerations, the Court held that,
on a correct interpretation, section 2(d) of the Charter did protect the
right to bargain collectively.
Four short years later, in Fraser,20 Rothstein J. (dissenting on this
point though concurring in the result), would have overturned Health
Services and reverted to the law established in the labour trilogy — that
is, that section 2(d) of the Charter does not protect collective bargaining.
Justice Rothstein affirmed the right of the Supreme Court of Canada to
reverse itself and noted that “the courts have set down, and academics
have suggested, a plethora of criteria for courts to consider in deciding
between upholding precedent and correcting error”.21 Justice Rothstein
considered this “non-exhaustive” list of criteria and concluded that:
Fundamentally, the question in every case involves a balancing: Do the
reasons in favour of following a precedent — such as certainty,
consistency, predictability and institutional legitimacy — outweigh the
need to overturn a precedent that is sufficiently wrong that it should not
be upheld and perpetuated?22

15

[2007] S.C.J. No. 27, [2007] 2 S.C.R. 391 (S.C.C.) [hereinafter “Health Services”].
[2011] S.C.J. No. 20, [2011] 2 S.C.R. 3 (S.C.C.) [hereinafter “Fraser”].
17
That trilogy of cases included: Reference re Public Service Employee Relations Act
(Alberta), [1987] S.C.J. No. 10, [1987] 1 S.C.R. 313 (S.C.C.); Public Service Alliance of Canada v.
Canada, [1987] S.C.J. No. 9, [1987] 1 S.C.R. 424 (S.C.C.); and Retail, Wholesale and Department
Store Union v. Saskatchewan, [1987] S.C.J. No. 8, [1987] 1 S.C.R. 460 (S.C.C.) [hereinafter
collectively “the labour trilogy”].
18
Health Services, supra, note 15, at para. 22.
19
Health Services, id., at para. 20.
20
Supra, note 16.
21
Id., at para. 133.
22
Id., at para. 139; see also paras. 133-138.
16
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A consideration of this fundamental question led Rothstein J. to conclude
that the Court should overrule Health Services. His reasons were that
Health Services addressed an issue of constitutional law and was thus
“not susceptible to being corrected in a lasting way by the legislative
branch”;23 Health Services “strayed significantly from earlier sound
precedents with respect to the purpose of Charter protection for freedom
of association;”24 the constitutionalization of collective bargaining was,
in his view, “unworkable”;25 there had been “intense academic criticism”
of Health Services;26 and, finally, Health Services was wrongly decided.27
The plurality responded to Rothstein J.’s judgment at length.28
The contrast in the approaches is best reflected in these two passages. The first is from the judgment of Rothstein J.:
First, the error in Health Services concerns a question of
constitutional law. Thus, not only does it go to one of the foundational
principles of our legal system, but it is not susceptible to being
corrected in a lasting way by the legislative branch. While s. 33 of the
Charter may allow Parliament or the legislatures to suspend,
temporarily, the force of this Court’s ruling, history over the last two
decades demonstrates that resort to s. 33 by legislatures has been
exceedingly rare. Health Services will, if left to stand, set out abiding
principles of constitutional law. Only the Court may correct this error
in fundamental principle. As noted in Planned Parenthood, it is
“common wisdom that the rule of stare decisis is not an ‘inexorable
command,’ and certainly it is not such in every constitutional case”
(p. 854). The jurisprudence of this Court contains similar observations.
Because the Charter involves the most fundamental principles
underlying our law, it is particularly important that its provisions be
correctly interpreted.
[McLachlin C.J.C.] and LeBel J. say that the constitutional nature of
Health Services should only be a final consideration with respect to
overruling difficult cases (para. 58). In my respectful view, and as my
reasons will endeavour to demonstrate, there are no shortage of reasons
to believe that Health Services is problematic on other grounds.

23
24
25
26
27
28

Id., at para. 141.
Id., at paras. 144, 152-171.
Id., at paras. 145, 256-269.
Id., at para. 146.
Id., at paras. 151-296.
Id., at paras. 52-96.
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Relying on Henry, my colleagues also warn that this Court should be
wary of overruling Health Services because doing so might have the
potential to diminish Charter protection (para. 58, citing Henry, at
para. 44). They say that this consideration “militate[s] in favour of
upholding” Health Services (para. 58). However, the Court cannot be
oblivious to errors in prior decisions. When considering overruling, the
Court must balance correctness and certainty. If there is a potential
diminishment arising from correcting prior error, that is a reason to be
cautious, not a reason to forego correcting prior error altogether.
Arguably, as Health Services itself strayed from prior precedent,
returning to those prior precedents would promote certainty. However,
even if certainty would favour retaining Health Services, in this case
the need for a constitutionally correct answer is paramount.29

The response of the plurality decision written by the Chief Justice and
LeBel J. is as follows:
Our colleague correctly recognizes at the outset of his reasons that
overturning a precedent of this Court is a step not to be lightly
undertaken. We would note that as we understand the law (see above),
rejection of Health Services implies rejection of Dunmore as well, since
the two cases rest on the same fundamental logic.
The seriousness of overturning two recent precedents of this Court,
representing the considered views of firm majorities, cannot be
overstated. This is particularly so given their recent vintage. Health
Services was issued only four years ago, and, when this appeal was
argued, only two years had passed.
Rothstein J. suggests that since Health Services deals with
constitutional law, the Court should be more willing to overturn it
(paras. 141-43). In our respectful view, this argument is not persuasive.
The constitutional nature of a decision is not a primary consideration
when deciding whether or not to overrule, but at best a final
consideration in difficult cases. Indeed, the fact that Health Services
relates to a constitutional Charter right may militate in favour of
upholding this past decision. As Binnie J. stated on behalf of a
unanimous Court in R. v. Henry, 2005 SCC 76, [2005] 3 S.C.R. 609,
“[t]he Court should be particularly careful before reversing a precedent
where the effect is to diminish Charter protection” (para. 44). Justice

29

Id., at paras. 141-143.
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Rothstein’s proposed interpretation of s. 2(d) of the Charter would
diminish the scope of the s. 2(d) right.30

There are some interesting lessons to be learned from this “dialogue”
between the two factions of the Court in Fraser. (These points are
relevant here, and will also bear on our discussion under the topic of
vertical stare decisis.)
The first is Rothstein J.’s very, and arguably ironic, “activist” stance
insofar as he was so ready to overturn a decision of the Court on which
the ink had barely dried. It seemed to be his view that the balance always
favours “correctness” over “certainty”. He seemed to share the view,
expressed most pithily by Lord Atkin in 1933, that: “Finality is a good
thing but justice is a better.”31 We agree with that. However, the Health
Services decision was, itself, made on the same basis. That is, the
majority in Health Services overturned the labour trilogy because it
considered the labour trilogy incorrect for various reasons. So this
dialogue does not reflect a difference in opinion as to the paramount
importance of being correct in constitutional matters, but rather a
difference in opinion as to which interpretation of section 2(d) was “the”
correct one.
Second, it is important to read what the plurality said about stare
decisis in Fraser keeping three points in mind: first, the plurality is
speaking about the implications of overturning two very recent majority
decisions of the Court; second, it is speaking as a court that need only
ever concern itself with horizontal stare decisis; and, third, it is speaking
as the very court that just overturned the labour trilogy on the basis that it
was simply incorrect. Thus, when the plurality speaks about the seriousness of overturning precedent, it is speaking about the particular folly of
revisiting the issue every two years. That is an observation about there
being a threshold need for a modicum of functional stability within the
judicial system for it to operate at all. When the plurality goes on to state
that the fact that the issue is a constitutional one does not make revisitation in the circumstances any more appropriate, it must be kept in mind
that it is saying that even a desire for correctness in constitutional matters
might not justify a pace of revisitation that threatens the system itself.
Further, the plurality is speaking as a court of ultimate authority — as a
court that has an absolute right to overrule itself if and when it has a
genuine realization of error. To such a court, the additional fact that any
30
31

Id., at paras. 56-58.
Ras Behari Lal v. King Emperor, [1933] All E.R. Rep. 723, at 726 (P.C.).
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given case is constitutional might indeed be largely irrelevant, given that
it has the right to depart from its own decisions at will in any event to
correct errors. Taking the facts and context into consideration, nothing
the plurality says in Fraser detracts from the fundamental point established in Health Services: i.e., that it is the role and duty of the Court to
provide what it believes to be a correct interpretation of the Charter, even
if that involves admitting long-standing and oft-repeated past judicial
error.
It is acknowledged that the plurality also said that “the fact that
Health Services relates to a constitutional Charter right may militate in
favour of upholding this past decision”.32 However, that statement must
not be taken out of its specific context — that is, that revisiting Health
Services and reverting to the labour trilogy would diminish constitutional
rights currently protected under the Health Services decision. The
plurality was not expressing a view that the Court should, in general,
hesitate to revisit Charter decisions. To take a broader interpretation of
what the plurality said in Fraser, and to assert that they held that the
constitutional nature of the decision is a reason for following precedent
in general, would fail to account for the Court’s fundamentally motivating concern in Health Services, where the primary reason for reversing
the labour trilogy was not merely the fact that these decisions were
wrong, but that they were wrong in a manner contrary to the rights and
freedoms protected by the Charter. Likewise Dickson C.J.C. in R. v.
Bernard, while acknowledging the importance of stare decisis, nonetheless held that the Charter was one of four factors that would allow the
Court to depart from a previous decision: “The special mandate of the
Charter has been found by the Court to require reconsideration of its
own past decisions, and, where necessary, to overrule those decisions
which fail to reflect Charter values.”33
As noted, the factions in Fraser disagreed on the “correct” interpretation of the Charter. However, what we wish to emphasize is that both
sides were, in fact, agreed that absent a set of circumstances that would
undermine the legitimacy and workability of the judicial process (a
threshold that in our submission must be an incredibly hard one to crest),
precedent should not be an obstacle to ensuring constitutional behaviour
by government.

32
33

Fraser, supra, note 16, at para. 58.
[1988] S.C.J. No. 96, [1988] 2 S.C.R. 833, at para. 34 (S.C.C.).
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However, the real concern of this paper lies with how the doctrine of
stare decisis should apply in its vertical convention in the Charter
context, with particular regard to giving due consideration to section 52
of the Charter, and it is to that topic that we now turn our attention.
2. Vertical Convention of Stare Decisis
The vertical convention of stare decisis holds that lower courts are
bound by the decisions of higher courts in their hierarchy. Thus the
superior court of a given province is bound by the decisions of the courts
of appeal of that province, and both are bound by decisions of the
Supreme Court of Canada and “pre-1949 decisions of the Judicial Committee of the Privy Council (J.C.P.C.) that have not been subsequently
overruled by the Supreme Court of Canada”.34
The vertical convention of stare decisis took on central importance
in Bedford.35 That case concerned the constitutional validity of three
provisions of the Criminal Code:36 section 210, which prohibits the
operation of common bawdy houses, section 212(1)(j), which prohibits
living on the avails of prostitution, and section 213(1)(c), which prohibits
communicating in public for the purpose of prostitution. These provisions were challenged on the basis of section 7 of the Charter. The
communication provision was also challenged on the basis of section
2(b) of the Charter.
Twenty years ago, in the Prostitution Reference,37 the Supreme Court
of Canada found that the communication provision constituted a violation of the section 2(b) protection for freedom of expression, and further
found that violation to be justified under section 1 of the Charter. Both
the communication provision and the bawdy house provision were found
to infringe the section 7 right to liberty, and both infringements were held
to be in accordance with the principles of fundamental justice. Canada
argued that the plaintiffs in Bedford ONSC38 were precluded from
challenging the bawdy house and communication provisions by the
Prostitution Reference and the doctrine of stare decisis. At the hearing
before the Ontario Superior Court of Justice, Himel J. did not consider
34

“Precedent Unbound?”, supra, note 13, at 138.
Supra, note 8.
36
Criminal Code, R.S.C. 1985, c. C-46.
37
Prostitution Reference, supra, note 9.
38
Bedford v. Canada (Attorney General), [2010] O.J. No. 4057, 327 D.L.R. (4th) 52 (Ont.
S.C.J.) [hereinafter “Bedford ONSC”].
35
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herself bound by the Supreme Court of Canada’s decision in the
Prostitution Reference with respect to either section 7 or section 2(b).
She held:
The Prostitution Reference is prima facie binding on this court.
...
However, Justice Laskin suggested a flexible approach to the
application of the principle of stare decisis, as a rigid adherence might
lead to “injustices in individual cases, continued application of legal
principles long since outdated as society has changed, and uncertainty
bred by judges who draw overly fine distinctions to avoid stare
decisis.”
...
I am persuaded that I am not foreclosed from hearing the challenge
based on s. 7 of the Charter as the issues argued in this case are
different than those argued in the Prostitution Reference. Although “the
principles of fundamental justice are to be found in the basic tenets of
our legal system” (Re B.C. Motor Vehicle Act, [1985] 2 S.C.R. 486, per
Lamer J. at p. 503), the principles at issue in this case were not clearly
articulated as such when the reference was heard. The jurisprudence on
s. 7 of the Charter has evolved considerably in the last two decades.
I am also persuaded that I may reconsider whether s. 213(1)(c) of the
Criminal Code is in violation of s. 2(b) of the Charter.39

The reasons she gave for this latter point were that there was a need
to reconsider constitutional interpretation because the Constitution is a
“living tree” and the constitutional amendment process was difficult;40
she noted that the Supreme Court of Canada had the authority to revisit
its previous decisions;41 relying on the Ontario Superior Court of Justice
decision in Wakeford v. Canada (Attorney General),42 she considered
whether there was an indication that the Supreme Court of Canada’s
decision was open to reconsideration either because of a shift in the
jurisprudence or developments in public policy or new facts.43 She
concluded:

39
40
41
42
43

Bedford ONSC, id., at paras. 66, 68, 75-76.
Bedford ONSC, id., at para. 77.
Id., at para. 78.
[2001] O.J. No. 390, 81 C.R.R. (2d) 342 (Ont. C.A.).
Bedford ONSC, supra, note 38, at paras. 79-80.
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In my view, the s. 1 analysis conducted in the Prostitution Reference
ought to be revisited given the breadth of evidence that has been
gathered over the course of the intervening twenty years. Furthermore,
it may be that the social, political, and economic assumptions
underlying the Prostitution Reference are no longer valid today. Indeed,
several western democracies have made legal reforms decriminalizing
prostitution to varying degrees. As well, the type of expression at issue
in this case is different from that considered in the Prostitution
Reference. Here, the expression at issue is that which would allow
prostitutes to screen potential clients for a propensity for violence. I
conclude, therefore, that it is appropriate in this case to decide these
issues based upon the voluminous record before me. As will become
evident following a review of the evidence filed by the parties, there is
a substantial amount of research that was not before the Supreme Court
in 1990.44

The Court of Appeal unanimously agreed that Himel J. was not foreclosed from considering the section 7 issues;45 however, they held that
she erred with respect to whether or not she was bound on the freedom of
expression issue. The Court explained that while stare decisis was
traditionally only applied to the ratio decidendi of a decision, the scope
of the doctrine had been expanded to encompass some obiter dicta:
However, the traditional division between ratio and obiter has
become more nuanced. It is now recognized that there is a spectrum of
authoritativeness on which the statements of an appellate court may be
placed. Justice Binnie, writing for a unanimous Supreme Court, stated
in R. v. Henry, 2005 SCC 76, [2005] 3 S.C.R. 609, at para. 57:
The issue in each case, to return to the Halsbury question, is
what did the case decide? Beyond the ratio decidendi which...
is generally rooted in the facts, the legal point decided by this

44

Id., at paras. 66-68, 75-83.
The Court of Appeal was careful to note that the Prostitution Reference, supra, note 9
considered a physical (as opposed to economic) liberty interest and that there was no binding
decision with respect to security of the person. In Bedford, the parties agreed that the liberty interest
was engaged and the respondents argued that their security of the person interest was engaged.
Further, in the Prostitution Reference the only principle of fundamental justice considered was
vagueness and the perceived inconsistency in Parliament’s response to prostitution. In Bedford the
respondents relied on the principles of arbitrariness, overbreadth and gross disproportionality. In
light of all this, the Court concluded: “It cannot be said that the Prostitution Reference decided the
substantive s. 7 issues before the application judge in this case. Therefore, stare decisis did not
apply, and the application judge did not err by conducting her own analysis and coming to her own
conclusion.”: Bedford, supra, note 8, at paras. 65-70.
45
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Court may be as narrow as the jury instruction at issue in
Sellars or as broad as the Oakes test. [Emphasis added.]
Justice Doherty, writing for a unanimous five-judge panel of this
court, discussed Henry in the recent decision of R. v. Prokofiew, 2010
ONCA 423, (2010), 100 O.R. (3d) 401, leave to appeal to S.C.C.
granted, [2010] S.C.C.A. No. 298, heard and reserved November 8,
2011, at para. 19:
The question then becomes the following: how does one
distinguish between binding obiter in a Supreme Court of
Canada judgment and non-binding obiter? In Henry, at para. 53,
Binnie J. explains that one must ask, “What does the case
actually decide?” Some cases decide only a narrow point in a
specific factual context. Other cases — including the vast
majority of Supreme Court of Canada decisions — decide
broader legal propositions and, in the course of doing so, set
out legal analyses that have application beyond the facts of
the particular case. [Emphasis added.]
These authorities delineate the boundary between binding and
non-binding statements of the Supreme Court, and they do so based on
an inquiry into the Court’s substantive reasoning process. Applying
Henry and Prokofiew, the question becomes: what did the Prostitution
Reference decide?46

With respect to the trial judge’s decision, the Court held:
First, the application judge misconceived the principle of stare
decisis when she described the Prostitution Reference as only “prima
facie binding on this court.” With respect, it was much more than that.
The Supreme Court’s decision that s. 213(1)(c) of the Criminal Code is
a justified limit on freedom of expression was fully binding on the
application judge, as there was no suggestion that it had been expressly
or by implication overruled by a subsequent decision of the Supreme
Court. In short, it is for the Supreme Court, and only that court, to
overrule one of its own decisions.47

The Court of Appeal held that Himel J. also erred in equating her
position, “when asked to reconsider a binding decision of the Supreme
Court, with the position of a court that is asked to reconsider one of its
46
Bedford, id., at paras. 58-60. See also the discussion in “Precedent Unbound?”, supra,
note 13, at 138-41.
47
Bedford, id., at para. 75.
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own prior decisions”,48 and “by holding that the binding authority of the
Prostitution Reference could be displaced by recasting the nature of the
expression at issue as promoting safety, and not merely commercial
expression”.49 The Court of Appeal specifically held that it was an error
for Himel J. to conclude that a change in evidence and legislative facts
was sufficient to trigger a reconsideration of a section 1 analysis by a
lower court.50
It is never an easy or comfortable position to take to say that a fivemember division of the Ontario Court of Appeal was wrong, especially
one comprised of individual jurists of the calibre of Doherty, Rosenberg,
MacPherson, Cronk and Feldman JJ.A. Nevertheless, with the greatest
respect, we are of the view that the Court did err in overturning Himel J.
and in so erring it missed an opportunity to participate in a transformative moment in Charter litigation. The error stemmed from assuming the
common law approach to stare decisis can be transported directly and
without alteration into the Charter context. In other words, the error
consisted of the failure to consider whether the traditional approach to
stare decisis is unduly broad in the Charter context, given the nature of
Charter litigation and the imperative of constitutional supremacy.
In our opinion, section 52 of the Constitution Act, 1982 effectively
imposes a constitutional duty on a trial court to distinguish, where
appropriate, a prior Charter decision on the basis of a change in legislative and social fact.51 To fail to distinguish a prior Charter decision where
such distinguishing is warranted amounts to a refusal by a trial court to
subject a law to Charter scrutiny. Further, the trial court’s constitutional
duty coincides with an institutional logic which also augurs in favour of
decision-makers of first instance conducting the initial Charter analysis.52
48

Id., at para. 81.
Id., at para. 82.
50
Id., at para. 83. It must be noted that the Supreme Court of Canada can itself reconsider
Charter issues in light of changed circumstances: see for example, in the context of s. 7, United
States of America v. Burns, [2001] S.C.J. No. 8, [2001] 1 S.C.R. 283, 2001 SCC 7, at para. 144
(S.C.C.). However, the Ontario Court of Appeal held that notwithstanding that the Supreme Court of
Canada had this power, the application judge erroneously equated her role, as a court of first
instance, with that of the Supreme Court of Canada (at paras. 75-80).
51
Section 52(1) provides: “The Constitution of Canada is the supreme law of Canada, and
any law that is inconsistent with the provisions of the Constitution is, to the extent of the inconsistency, of no force or effect.”
52
See, for example, Conway, supra, note 3; Douglas/Kwantlen Faculty Assn. v. Douglas
College, [1990] S.C.J. No. 124, [1990] 3 S.C.R. 570 (S.C.C.); Cuddy Chicks Ltd. v. Ontario (Labour
Relations Board), [1991] S.C.J. No. 42, [1991] 2 S.C.R. 5 (S.C.C.); Tétreault-Gadoury v. Canada
(Employment and Immigration Commission), [1991] S.C.J. No. 41, [1991] 2 S.C.R. 22 (S.C.C.); see
also Nova Scotia (Workers’ Compensation Board) v. Martin; Nova Scotia (Workers’ Compensation
49
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We turn to a consideration of how these principles may be reconciled
with the doctrine of stare decisis.

III. RECONCILING STARE DECISIS WITH
CONSTITUTIONAL SUPREMACY
At first blush, a stark tension may appear between the emphasis
placed by the common law doctrine of stare decisis on consistency,
certainty and predictability in the law, and the assertion that adjudicators
of first instance may be under a constitutional imperative to apply the
highest law (the Constitution) to the specific set of legislative and social
facts before them. This was the tension at the heart of the Bedford case
and it is the same tension now in play in the Carter case.
Having regard to this constitutional imperative may not necessitate
abandonment of stare decisis in Charter matters, although one might be
tempted to go that far. Indeed it strikes us as being very plausible to
argue that in Charter cases stare decisis should be more akin to the
horizontal variety than the vertical such that prior decisions “are not
strictly binding, but should be followed unless there are compelling
reasons to overrule them”.53 At a minimum, however, the application of
stare decisis in the Charter context must be tempered, both because it is a
common law doctrine and thus should be subordinate to the dictates of
the Constitution, and because constitutional cases are, in some respects,
materially different from non-constitutional cases.
That the common law needs to be adapted — or perhaps “sidestepped” — to meet the demands of the Constitution is far from a novel
proposition. A relatively recent example of the Supreme Court of Canada
rejecting a common law rule in favour of the principle of constitutionality is Kingstreet Investments Ltd. v. New Brunswick (Finance).54 At issue
in Kingstreet was the appropriate remedy in circumstances where the
government attempts to retain unconstitutionally collected taxes. The

Board) v. Laseur, [2003] S.C.J. No. 54, [2003] 2 S.C.R. 504 (S.C.C.); Paul v. British Columbia
(Forest Appeals Commission), [2003] S.C.J. No. 34, [2003] 2 S.C.R. 585 (S.C.C.); Quebec (Attorney
General) v. Quebec (Human Rights Tribunal), [2004] S.C.J. No. 35, [2004] 2 S.C.R. 223 (S.C.C.);
Okwuobi v. Lester B. Pearson School Board; Casimir v. Quebec (Attorney General); Zorrilla v.
Quebec (Attorney General), [2005] S.C.J. No. 16, [2005] 1 S.C.R. 257 (S.C.C.).
53
“Precedent Unbound?”, supra, note 13, at 137.
54
[2007] S.C.J. No. 1, [2007] 1 S.C.R. 3 (S.C.C.) [hereinafter “Kingstreet”].
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Court held that: “The Court’s central concern must be to guarantee
respect for constitutional principles.”55 The Court also held:
When the government collects and retains taxes pursuant to ultra
vires legislation, it undermines the rule of law. To permit the Crown to
retain an ultra vires tax would condone a breach of this most
fundamental constitutional principle. As a result, a citizen who has
made a payment pursuant to ultra vires legislation has a right to
restitution: P. Birks, “Restitution from the Executive: A Tercentenary
Footnote to the Bill of Rights”, in P. D. Finn, ed., Essays on Restitution
(1990), c. 6, at p. 168.56

The Court held that the government must repay unconstitutionally
collected taxes. In doing so, it rejected the obiter statements of La Forest
J. on behalf of three members of the Court in Air Canada v. British
Columbia57 who proposed an immunity rule for such situations. As well,
the Court declined to base the remedy on the doctrine of unjust enrichment. The Court explained that although unjust enrichment claims may
be appropriate against the government in some cases:
... The taxpayers in this case [have] recourse to a remedy as a matter of
constitutional right. This remedy is in fact the only appropriate remedy
because it raises important constitutional principles which would be
ignored by treating the claim under another category of restitution....58

Thus, the Court accepted that neither the common law nor equitable
doctrines should operate to shield unconstitutional government action
from review.59
55

Id., at para. 14.
Id., at para. 15.
57
[1989] S.C.J. No. 44, [1989] 1 S.C.R. 1161 (S.C.C.) [hereinafter “Air Canada”].
58
Kingstreet, supra, note 54, at para. 34.
59
The common law of standing is but another example of a doctrine which had to be
adapted to meet the demands of the Constitution: Thorson v. Canada (Attorney General), [1975]
S.C.J. No. 45, [1975] 1 S.C.R. 138 (S.C.C.). Of course, the same-sex marriage litigation is an even
more recent and outstanding example of the common law having to be amended to comply with the
Charter: see, e.g., EGALE Canada Inc. v. Canada (Attorney General) (sub nom. Barbeau v. British
Columbia (Attorney General)), [2003] B.C.J. No. 994, 225 D.L.R. (4th) 472 (B.C.C.A.); Halpern v.
Canada (Attorney General), [2003] O.J. No. 2268, 225 D.L.R. (4th) 529 (Ont. C.A.); Hendricks v.
Québec (Procureur général), [2002] J.Q. No. 3816, [2002] R.J.Q. 2506 (Que. S.C.), vard [2004] J.Q.
no 2593, [2004] R.J.Q. 851 (Que. C.A.); Dunbar v. Yukon, [2004] Y.J. No. 61, 122 C.R.R. (2d) 149
(Y.T.S.C.); Vogel v. Canada (Attorney General), [2004] M.J. No. 418 (Man. Q.B.); Boutilier v.
Nova Scotia (Attorney General), [2004] N.S.J. No. 357 (N.S.S.C.); and W. (N.) v. Canada (Attorney
General), [2004] S.J. No. 669, 246 D.L.R. (4th) 345 (Sask. Q.B.). In part as a result of these prior
decisions, the Supreme Court of Canada exercised its discretion not to answer the question of
whether the opposite-sex requirement for marriage for civil purposes as established by the common
law and set out for Quebec in s. 5 of the Federal Law-Civil Law Harmonization Act, No. 1, S.C.
56
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We say that respect for constitutional principles must be the governing consideration when the issue is whether or to what extent lower
courts are bound by the decisions of higher courts.
Yet we do not rest on that point alone. As noted above, the point at
which constitutional cases most differ from non-constitutional cases is in
the Charter context and, within that context, in the section 1 justification
analysis. This is reflected in the fact that the Court articulated the
“contextual approach”60 to the Charter and in its later description of
context as “the indispensable handmaiden” to a proper application of
section 1.61 It is in Charter cases, and especially under section 1, that
judicial reasoning is deeply intertwined with the social and legislative
facts “that establish the purpose and background of legislation, including
its social, economic and cultural context”.62 The Supreme Court of
Canada’s repeated warnings about the importance of determining Charter
cases in a full factual matrix recognize that these facts are a driving
consideration in Charter decisions. The central importance of legislative
and social facts in section 1 Charter decisions is, in turn, the reason why
a prior section 1 analysis is only binding to the extent that a fundamentally similar factual matrix continues to exist.63
It is a trial court’s duty to apply the Charter; in order to fulfil that
duty, a trial court must ensure that it does not foreclose itself, by overbroad application of precedent, from considering as cases of first
instance matters that should be adjudicated under the Charter on their
own, contemporary, social and legislative facts. That is, the duty to apply
the Charter as the highest law of the land gives rise to a correlative duty
to distinguish precedents that are, in reality, based on a social or legislative factual matrix that no longer exists. In short, a Charter analysis
regarding section 1 inherently has potential for obsolescence, and a trial
court must be particularly alive to that possibility.
2001, c. 4, was consistent with the Charter: Reference re Same-Sex Marriage, [2004] S.C.J. No. 75,
[2004] 3 S.C.R. 698, at paras. 61-72 (S.C.C.).
60
Edmonton Journal v. Alberta (Attorney General), [1989] S.C.J. No. 124, [1989] 2 S.C.R.
1326, at paras. 43-52 (S.C.C.).
61
Thomson Newspapers Co. v. Canada (Attorney General), [1998] S.C.J. No. 44, [1998] 1
S.C.R. 877, at para. 87 (S.C.C.).
62
Danson v. Ontario (Attorney General), [1990] S.C.J. No. 92, [1990] 2 S.C.R. 1086, at
para. 27 (S.C.C.).
63
See, e.g., MacKay v. Manitoba, [1989] S.C.J. No. 88, [1989] 2 S.C.R. 357, at paras. 9-11
(S.C.C.); British Columbia (Attorney General) v. Christie, [2007] S.C.J. No. 21, [2007] 1 S.C.R.
873, at para. 28 (S.C.C.); Ermineskin Indian Band and Nation v. Canada, [2009] S.C.J. No. 9,
[2009] 1 S.C.R. 222, at paras. 193-194 (S.C.C.); Gosselin v. Quebec (Attorney General), [2002]
S.C.J. No. 85, [2002] 4 S.C.R. 429, at paras. 17-19, 47 (S.C.C.).
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In circumstances where an infringement of a Charter right has been
previously found and justified under section 1, and a trial court is
satisfied that the relevant legislative and social facts underpinning the
case before it are materially and significantly different from those that
were relied upon by an earlier but higher court to justify the law, the trial
court has a constitutional obligation to determine whether the law is still
constitutionally valid. In making this determination, the trial court is not
overruling decisions of the Supreme Court of Canada; rather, it is
determining an issue never before decided, and is therefore not bound by
stare decisis especially as we believe it ought to be applied in constitutional cases (assuming it applies at all). This is not a radical departure
from the doctrine of stare decisis, but rather an application of the
doctrine that takes into account the special role that legislative and social
facts play in Charter cases. Stare decisis in its traditional form recognizes
that the process of judicial reasoning can be fundamentally different
because of different jurisprudential developments.64 Given the fact that
judicial reasoning in a Charter section 1 analysis is “rooted in the
facts”,65 how can it not be the case that the process of judicial reasoning
in this context is fundamentally different when there are fundamentally
different legislative and social facts?
The Ontario Court of Appeal appears to flatly disagree. However, we
respectfully take the position that the Court of Appeal effectively turned
constitutional supremacy on its head in Bedford when it held that “the
need for a robust application of stare decisis is particularly important in
the context of Charter litigation”.66 With respect, this would allow the
“tail” of stare decisis to “wag the dog” of section 52.
We fully agree with the approach taken by the trial judge in Bedford
ONSC. A trial judge should regard a prior higher court decision on the
same Charter point as prima facie binding. However, if there is sufficient
factual difference pleaded to merit proceeding to an evidentiary hearing,
a trial should be permitted. If, following that trial, the trial judge is
persuaded that there has been a significant and material change in facts,
the trial judge should make a finding to that effect. Where the trial judge
makes such a finding, we argue that the trial judge is then constitutionally obliged to carry out a full Charter analysis based on the record
before him or her and to make all of the requisite findings of fact, mixed
64
65
66

Bedford, supra, note 8, at para. 57.
Id., at para. 58.
Id., at para. 83.
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fact and law, and law that he or she would make in the normal course. An
appellate court will then be in a position to carry out appellate review,
including review of whether the trial judge correctly concluded that there
had been a significant and material change in the facts. If the trial judge’s
finding in the latter respect was wrong, the decision of the appeal court
may be that the trial judge ought to have held the matter foreclosed by
stare decisis. However, if the trial judge’s finding in the latter respect
was correct, the appeal court will be situated to carry out an appeal in the
normal course.
In Bedford, the Ontario Court of Appeal appears to contemplate that
the trial judge should agree to hold the hearing, but simply perform the
role of finder of fact, setting out bare evidentiary conclusions and then
pushing the matter up towards the Supreme Court of Canada.67 As
already discussed, it is our position that a trial court that takes this
approach fails in its duty to determine whether the purported precedent
is, in actuality, an authoritative precedent in the Charter context. Further,
such a trial court also risks failing in its duty under section 52 of the
Constitution.
We add to this a further institutional concern, which is that we do not
believe it is realistic to expect a trial court, which would be limited on
the approach articulated by the Court of Appeal in Bedford to making
only findings of fact, to make sufficient findings to ever truly enable an
appellate court to carry out a section 1 analysis as if it stood in the shoes
of the trial court. The findings and analysis that go into determining
whether laws are rationally connected, minimally impairing or disproportionate — questions of mixed law and fact — are the unique province of
the adjudicator of first instance — the person most intimately familiar
with the entirety of the evidence and the person who has had the benefit
of full argument from the parties regarding that evidence and its import.
Taking Bedford and Carter as examples, these cases involved vast
evidence, lay and expert, regarding the operation and impact of the law
on individuals, institutions and society, as well as the alternatives in
place in other jurisdictions. In our opinion, the trial judge is far and away
the person best situated to, for example, find and weigh the salutary and
deleterious effects of the legislation. This is the very point that the
Supreme Court of Canada has been making for years in asserting that
there must be a proper record and findings at the trial level in order for a
Charter matter to proceed. The approach endorsed by the Ontario Court
67

Id., at para. 76.
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of Appeal in Bedford puts the appellate courts at an extreme disadvantage
by depriving them of findings at first instance.
The Ontario Court of Appeal did not address the concerns raised
above in its decision in Bedford. Instead, its reasoning focuses on what
are mainly floodgates concerns. With respect, under scrutiny, none of
those floodgates concerns is particularly valid, let alone compelling. The
Court held:
In our view ... Given the nature of the s. 1 test, especially in
controversial matters, the evidence and legislative facts will continue to
evolve, as will values, attitudes and perspectives. But this evolution
alone is not sufficient to trigger a reconsideration in the lower courts.
If it were otherwise, every time a litigant came upon new evidence
or a fresh perspective from which to view the problem, the lower courts
would be forced to reconsider the case despite authoritative holdings
from the Supreme Court on the very points at issue. This would
undermine the legitimacy of Charter decisions and the rule of law
generally. It would be particularly problematic in the criminal law,
where citizens and law enforcement have the right to expect that they
may plan their conduct in accordance with the law as laid down by the
Supreme Court. Such an approach to constitutional interpretation yields
not a vibrant living tree but a garden of annuals to be regularly
uprooted and replaced.68

We agree that a lower court should not be entitled to ignore “authoritative holdings from the Supreme Court on the very points in issue”, but
that raises the question of when and in what circumstances a Supreme
Court decision can be regarded as authoritative. It is our position that
where a trial court is satisfied that the factual matrix before it is significantly and materially different than that underlying a prior section 1
analysis, it should not regard the prior decision as authoritative. If the
facts are materially different, it makes no juridical sense to bar the trial
court from proceeding to a decision based on the new facts.
We also agree that a lower court cannot refuse to follow a Supreme
Court precedent “every time a litigant came upon new evidence or a
fresh perspective from which to view the problem”. We are not proposing
such an approach. We are talking here of cases in which a plaintiff has
succeeded in persuading a court that an evidentiary trial is worthwhile
and then, in the context of that trial, has succeeded in putting evidence
68

Id., at paras. 83-84.
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before the court that is not merely “fresh”, but rather that demonstrably
establishes that the prior factual matrix has materially changed. We are
not contemplating cases where a subsequent litigant has merely discovered evidence that a previous litigant was not aware of or failed to
adduce. The evidentiary hurdle we are positing is not a slight one, and
there is no reason to suspect that many cases would successfully clear it.
We appreciate that constitutional litigation should not “yield a garden
of annuals to be regularly uprooted and replaced”, but submit that that is
not an appropriate metaphor given the evidentiary process and threshold
described above. We would say that the Ontario Court of Appeal, in its
effort to avoid gardening annuals, is preventing trial courts from discharging their duty to prune and tend the living tree that is the Constitution.69 Trial courts should not be expected to ignore dead branches.
Further, citizens invoking their fundamental rights should not be asked
to stand by patiently while trial courts wilfully do so. It must not be
forgotten that constitutional law affects people — the people of Canada,
not merely the parties to the litigation — in a fundamental manner. There
can be no better illustration than the Carter case: the Charter can touch
upon matters of life and death. The practical reality is that in many, if not
all, Charter cases “[t]he denial of early access to remedies is a denial of
an appropriate and just remedy.”70 Thus a litigant who must wait until his
or her case winds its way through the various levels of court and up to
the Supreme Court of Canada may well be deprived of any meaningful
vindication of his or her rights.
So while we understand the Ontario Court of Appeal’s concern,
noted above, that it may be “particularly problematic in the criminal law,
where citizens ... have the right to expect that they may plan their
conduct in accordance with the law as laid down by the Supreme
Court”71 for a lower court to find conduct long held to be lawful to
suddenly be criminal, it does not seem problematic at all for a court to
conclude that laws long thought to be constitutional (and conduct
contrary to those laws to be criminal) to be unconstitutional (and thus the
conduct perfectly lawful). As for changing the expectation of those
69
Yet another analogy is that suggested by Smith J. in Carter, supra, note 10, where she
suggested to counsel that this argument was akin to saying that Charter decisions were like
perennials — that is, they last for a few seasons but have a stale date. We decline to adopt the
analogy because it suggests that factual obsolescence is inevitable, when, notwithstanding that it is
always a possibility, it may be relatively rare in occurrence. (Also, the Constitution is obviously, in a
metaphorical sense, a tree.)
70
Conway, supra, note 3, at para. 79.
71
Bedford, supra, note 8, at para. 84 (emphasis added).
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involved in law enforcement, that, with respect, does not seem to warrant
the same consideration. The Charter was not designed to protect government rights.
Finally, the Ontario Court of Appeal in Bedford expressed concern
that allowing a trial court to depart from a higher court’s decision simply
because of a change in legislative and social facts could “undermine the
legitimacy of Charter decisions and the rule of law generally”.72 We fail
to see how that would be the result. We note that section 33 of the
Charter obliges a government that invokes the override provision to
justify an infringement to revisit the matter every five years. In the face
of that entrenched understanding of obsolescence, it is difficult to see
how or why the citizen or government should regard a section 1 revisitation triggered by a finding of significant and material change in facts as a
threat to the rule of law. Further, contrary to the Court of Appeal’s
suggestion, revisitation in such circumstances does not throw the status
quo into disorder any more than would be the case under a Charter
challenge of first instance.
Thus from a doctrinal, institutional and remedial perspective, it
makes sense that trial courts faced with constitutional issues, even
constitutional issues that have arisen before but on substantially different
facts, should and must determine the constitutional questions at stake in
the case on the facts before them. This is especially the case when
section 1 of the Charter is the pivotal provision in play and the changed
facts in question are legislative and social. Appellate courts can weigh in
in the usual course. This is the only approach that can reconcile section
52 with the doctrine of stare decisis.

IV. CONCLUSION
We return to the question of why the writers considered this topic
appropriate for inclusion in a series addressing “transformative” moments in Charter litigation. As indicated in the introduction, the Supreme
Court of Canada has built up three decades of Charter jurisprudence.
However, the Charter is not the only thing that is 30 years older. Canadian society has itself changed substantially, in many respects dramatically, in that same time frame. The question that we have sought to
address is the proper role of the trial courts in 2012 (and beyond) when
72
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faced with a claim that a prior Supreme Court of Canada decision no
longer speaks to the reality of Canadian society.
As exemplified by Health Services, the Supreme Court of Canada is
quite prepared to recognize its own youthful folly. However, we have not
analyzed the question of whether it is for that Court alone to correct its
own mistakes. Instead, we have asked what should happen where it is
alleged not that a prior decision is wrong, but rather that it no longer
“fits” the social and legislative facts. As we have attempted to outline
above, in Charter litigation, social and legislative facts are especially key
under section 1 of the Charter. Cases that seek to revisit these issues in
the face of a prior Supreme Court of Canada decision — cases like
Bedford and Carter — do so because the earlier decision held the
challenged law to be constitutional notwithstanding the infringement of
Charter rights. The issue raised before the second trial court in such cases
is whether the infringement in question is still justifiable.
Treating precedents like the Prostitution Reference and Rodriguez as
absolutely binding not only makes it difficult, expensive and in some
cases ultimately futile for the committed to obtain a constitutional
remedy, it also operates as a significant disincentive, preventing the less
committed from making the attempt at all. That is a state of affairs that
ultimately operates to relieve the government of the obligation to justify
continuing infringements on Charter rights. It also deprives the radical
and liberatory principles enunciated in the Charter of their progressive
promise.
This is an issue of our time. The Carter and Bedford cases signal that
a threshold has been reached based on a combination of 30 years of
social change and the now considerable volume of past jurisprudence.
We have identified this is as a “transformative moment” in the potential
sense. Now is the time when it will be decided to what degree our
Charter past will be allowed to be an obstacle to our Charter future.

V. AFTERWORD
This paper was presented at the Osgoode Hall Conference on Constitutional Cases in May 2012. The judgment in Carter was rendered just
one month later in June 2012. In Carter, Smith J. concluded that Rodriguez had decided that Ms. Rodriguez was deprived of her section 7
Charter rights to liberty and security of the person, but that these deprivations were in accordance with the principle of fundamental justice that
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laws not be arbitrary. However, Smith J. accepted the Carter plaintiffs’
arguments that the Supreme Court of Canada in Rodriguez had not
considered whether the prohibition also engaged the right to life, and had
not considered whether the section 7 deprivations were in accordance
with principles of fundamental justice that laws not be overbroad or
grossly disproportionate.
Justice Smith also concluded that the decision in Rodriguez did not
decide whether section 241(b) of the Criminal Code infringes section 15
of the Charter; rather, the Court had simply assumed that section 15 was
infringed and moved directly to a section 1 analysis. In Carter, the
plaintiffs argued that that the final step in the section 1 analysis, balancing the salutary and deleterious effects of the legislation, had been
changed as a result of the intervening Supreme Court of Canada decision
in Alberta v. Hutterian Brethren of Wilson Colony.73 Justice Smith
accepted this argument. The Carter plaintiffs also argued that because of
the existence of changed legislative and social facts, the section 1
analysis in Rodriguez was, in any event, obsolete and not binding on that
basis. For the purposes of this paper, and in light of the decision in
Bedford discussed above, these are the stare decisis issues from Carter
that bear most directly upon the topic of this paper. With respect to these
points, Smith J. held:
It is true, as the defendants submit, that the Supreme Court did not
enunciate a new test. However, in my view Hutterian Brethren marks a
substantive change, rather than the addition of a nuance. The Court
made clear that the final step in the proportionality analysis is neither
redundant nor a mere summary of the first two steps, although, as
Professor Hogg observed, it had come to be viewed that way. Courts
are to widen their perspective at the final stage to take full account of
the deleterious effects of the infringement on individuals or groups, and
determine whether the benefits of the legislation are worth that cost.
That is a different question than whether the legislation is rationally
connected to the government’s objective or impairs the rights as little as
possible.
I agree with the plaintiffs that the Supreme Court of Canada, in
Hutterian Brethren, put life into the final balancing step in the analysis
of proffered justifications for infringements of Charter rights.
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In Bedford, it was not argued that the law with respect to s. 1
analysis had evolved; only that the legislative and social facts had
changed.
I note as well that, while in principle a trial judge could find facts
without conducting a legal analysis in order to create a record for
appellate courts to decide section 1 issues, it would be an unusual
exercise. Facts are not normally found in a legal vacuum — they are
found in a context, for a reason and with a purpose. Indeed, without a
legal framework, how is the primordial task of determining the
relevance of evidence possible? Charter analysis is always to be
contextual. Assessing justification under s. 1 is a particularly factintensive process. Similarly, it might be said that finding facts for a s. 1
inquiry is law-intensive, making reference to the governing legal
principles essential.
The existence of a different set of legislative and social facts on its
own may not warrant a fresh s. 1 inquiry. However, it is unnecessary
for me to say more about that point because I think that significantly
and materially different legislative facts, along with a change in the
legal principles to be applied, can. Because those conditions exist in
this case, I will address the s. 1 arguments of the parties, particularly at
the final two stages where minimal impairment and proportionality of
effects are assessed.74

Thus, it seems that Smith J. agreed with the Carter plaintiffs that the
approach articulated by the Ontario Court of Appeal was at least problematic. However, she ultimately declined to squarely address the issue
of whether section 1’s built-in obsolescence could alone justify or require
a court of first instance’s departure from Supreme Court of Canada
precedent. It remains to be seen whether and on what grounds the
decision in Carter will be appealed. It is entirely possible that the issue
of stare decisis will remain central as the Bedford and Carter cases move
forward.
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